E 475 ' 

E. THE 



BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 



By 
GEORGE W. HOSMER, M.D. 



REPRINTED FROM THE SUNDAY WORLD OF JUNE 29, 1913 



REVISED BY THE AUTHOR 



NEW YORK 

The Press Publishing Company 
The New York World 

1913 



V^ J' 




r 



THE 



BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 



By 
GEORGE W. HOSMER, M D, 



REPRINTED FROM THE SUNDAY WCRLD OF JUNE 29, 1913 



REVISED BY THE AUTHOR 



NEW YORK 

The Press Publishing Company 
The New York World 

1913 



• 5-3 

•Hi 



THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG 

By George W. Hosmer, M.D. 

ON this day fifty years ago a hostile army of 70,000 veteran sol- 
diers, commanded by a great General, was in Pennsylvania — 
near to the capital of that State — 50 miles northwest of Balti- 
more ; and there was a sudden fear rn many great cities and consternation 
in all the country. All men knew that this invasion represented the con- 
fidence of the Confederate commander in his power to conquer peace by 
winning in the North a great battle, the price of which would be the dis- 
solution of the Union and the recognition of the independence of the 
Confederacy. That wa^ the meaning of his presence in Pennsylvania. 

Only the Army of the 'Potomac could come between the country and 
that bad consequence. Between these two armies there was to be hard 
fig'hting therefore, and it began in the forenoon of July 1 out on the 
pretty country roads to the northwest of the town of Gettysburg. Gen, 
Lee, assuming that he was nearly alone ini Pennsylvania, and knowing 
that he was in a land full of fat cattle and good: horses, had his forces 
much scattered for the most practical reasons ; but when he beard that 
the Army of the Potomac was near he sent urgent orders to all his divi- 
sions to concentrate at Gettysburg — for some were to the east, some to 
the north and some to the west of that town. On that day the Army of 
the Potomac was moving to the northward — the First Corps in advance 
and near to Gettysburg, the cavalry in front. Gen. Buford of the First 
Cavalry Division had been sent toward "to find the enemy," and he had 
done it. It was not very difficult. 'He found them coming down the 
roads from Casbtown, Miimmasburg and several other places, and there 
were plenty of them. He was well supplied with cannon and the noise 
of his welcome was heard far and wide in all that part of Pennsylvania, 
and he stood in the way. 

Marching Toward the Sound of the Firing. 

On the same day, in the bright and pleasant summer weather — not 
very hot — ^the Twelfth Corps, far to the south' of Gettysburg, was mak- 
ing its easy way toward some uncertain destination which could not be 
named, as there was no prophet in the party, but which .proved to be the 
heights just south of Gettysburg — a piece of ground that was to 'be dedi- 



cated to history as one more of the notable spots where men have killed 
one another on a grand scale. Gen. Slocum was the commander. Other 
Generals were Alpheus Williams, Thomas H. Ruger, George S. Greene, 
John W. Geary, afterward Governor of Pennsylvania — all splendid fel- 
lows; and I was in that very good company. 

Marshal Foix was so sure of himself and his comrades on the way to 
Waterloo that they marched "without fear and without hope" — without 
fear of the enemy, without hope as to the future of France. In this little 
company they were equally without fear, but not without hope — yet the 
hope was not so dazzling as to be\\^ilder any one. Hope had fooled them 
so many times that they were wea.ry, and just now one more commander 
of the army had 'been sacrificed to the infernal gods, and they were to 
try a new man, and to do it with the assistance of the enemy. They had 
every sort of courage except the sort that can make men sanguine in such 
circumstances. So it was on nearly all the roads coming up from the 
South on that summer day. For pn other roads, all with their faces the 
same way, came the Second Corps, the Third, Fifth and Sixth Oorps= 
and the Sixth was to make a great march to get there in time. 

How They Talked. 

They talked much about the change of conunanders. Nobody there 
oared much for Hooker. Some hated him. Two things against him 
seemed to rankle — the sudden collapse after Chancellorsville of a cam- 
paign beautifully begun, and that collapse produced only by the failure 
of a corps that was not thought to be the most precious part of the army. 
The other thought .seem^ed to involve disgrace — that Stonewall Jackson 
had made a flank march half way around our army and never a finger 
lifted to stop him till he reached the end of his imarch. 

But there was la sentiment in favor of Hooker when any one thought 
of Halleck. How would ^ou ,like to command an army while tied to the 
apron strings of your querulous grandmother, who understands that sihe 
has been bom to find fault if fault can be imagined on any occasion? 
There w^as much wonder whether the telegraph connecting the military 
part of the war with Administrative functionaries was not necessarily a 
detriment to the army. 

For Meade everybody had a good word and nobody an enthusiastic 
word. Yet that modest soldier was to win the greatest open battle of the 
war against the enemy's greatest commander. But nobody made him 
ridiculous, as they bad made McClellan, by calling him a Little Napoleon. 

And presently as we went on we came to a place where the air 



vibrated in response to tlie voice of iperpetual artillery, and I left the 
company and went forward to see what was up. So I came to Gettys- 
burg and met that queer procession that one always meets on the safe 
side of a populous place when there is a 'battle on the other side — the 
frigtitened people, men, women and children, seeking safety and carrying 
all that queer junk and broken ends of utility which they regard as 
household treasures. 

Reynolds, Biiford, Douhleday and Others- 

All the noise we had heard was the reverberation in the hills of the 
dispute between our fellows and the other fellows out on the country 
roads where Buford was. Heth's and Pender's divisions of Lee's army 
were there. They had been over in the Chambersburg region and were 
coming in and Bnford was making it difficult. Gen. Reynolds with the 
First Corps was coming on and he had told Buford to hold .the enemy 
till the infantry could get up, and Buford with cavalry and artillery was 
doing it like a gallant gentleman. 

Reynolds came up in a hurry with the First Corps, and then there 
was a battle. Reynolds had the command of our left wing with two corps 
of infantry, the first and the Eleventh. The Eleventh was behind and he 
did what he cou'ld with the First, and used very badly several of the 
enemy's brigades. He had on his hands at first only Heth's division. 
Then came in Pender's division, and then began to come in far to his 
right Ewell's corps, which had been to the north and east. Reynolds held 
the enemy until the Eleventh Corps was near and he sent orders for it to 
come in on his right. And now came a calamity. Reynolds was shot in 
the head and killed instantly by one of the enemy's sharpsho'Oters. This 
was at 1 1 o'clock. 

Howard Becomes Commander on the Field. 

Howard with the Eleventh Corps, coming through Gettysburg, had 
halted his command there and gone to the top of a high house and sur- 
veyed the field, not knowing what had happened. But he studied the 
ground and he had the coup d'oeil. He saw that for such a battle as was 
on the cards the region in which the First Corps was fighting would be 
ultimately untenable and saw the advantage of the ground behind Gettys- 
burg — the Cemetery Ridge. Descending, he formed on that ground the 
Second Division of his corps, commanded by Gen. Von Steinwehr, with 
three batteries. He was then informed of the loss of Reynolds. This 
made him Commander on the Field and he made his headquarters on 
Cemetery Ridge, but sent to the assistance of the First Corps, now com- 



manded by Doubkday, the First and Third Divisions of the Eleventh 
Corps, commanded by Gen. Schurz. The Third Division was Barlow's. 
All this put our battle out of joint. 

Gen. Schurz's command was formed with its left toward Doubleday 
on the Mummasburg road, but not connecting, and liis right near Rock 
Creek, and when Ewell put in all his force he sent a brigade between 
Doubleday and Schurz, and as Gordon came in on Ewell's extreme left 
he caught Schurz's line on the flank, and the case looked hopeless for us. 
Barlow went down. Many men were killed and wounded, and the whole 
line was in very bad shape. 

How a Supremely Important Choice Was Made- 

Schurz sent peremptory orders for Von Steinwehr to reinforce him 
with his division, but Von Steinwehr, who was a professional soldier, 
could see from bis standpoint more than could be seen on the field, and 
could see that for him to advance would only sacrifice one more division 
in a hopeless fight, and perhaps sacrifice the position he 'held — the key of 
the whole scheme of the battle. He went to Howard, who was nearby, 
and asked what he should do. I happened to be there when he came. It 
was Uiot necessary to argue the case. He was ordered to stay where he 
was. If another order had been given Gordon's div^iisan of the enemy 
would have had that height in balf an hour and the First Corps would 
have been isolated and destroyed that day. And our corps as they came up 
would have been concentrated on some less favorable ground; and it 
would have been altogether anotiher battle. 

Schurz's men became mere fugitives, but the splendid fellows of the 
First Corps and the cavalry, skilfully handled by Doubleday, Wadsworth 
and Buford, fought Iheir way through the afternoon to Cemetery Ridge, 
and there a strong defensive line was formed with Von Steinwehr in tihe 
centre and the First Corps on the right and left; batteries in position and 
the cavalry out on the plain to the left. And thus the forces already up 
on both sides had been fought to a standstill, and we waited for the others. 

Hancock Approves the Choice Made by Howard and 
Von Steinwehr- 

Hancock came on the ground about 6 o'clock, for Meaide had heard 
all that had happened and had sent him forward to command on the field. 
Howard, who was his senior, did not receive him with open arms, but they 



were both too big to permit a question of etiquette to interfere with dufty 
and they agreed on all that should be done. 

I had wi'tnessed the clrcuimstance in which Howard had fixed the fact 
that we should hold for the impending 'battle the ground oa which we 
finally foug-'ht it and on which he had fixed his headquarters during the 
hours in which he commanded (the army, and it was pleasant to hear the 
exuberant Hancock about three hours later deliver an enthusiastic opinion 
on the same point. His judgment assumed ithe practical form of a 
declaration that the position "had no flanks." And certainly at the first 
view it did look that way. Yet it had flanks, and the enemy found them, 
but they were flanks that proved very discouraging for him and very good 
for us, and the magnificent soldier may have intended to say that. 

It was interesting to find the opinions of our two generals confinmed 
by the enemy's anxiety on this subject. Ewell came and looked us over 
and wisely left us alone. He in the afternoon had had Gordon's, Hay's 
and Dole's brigades ready to seize the ground then held only by Von 
Steinwehr, and his heart was broken when he was stopped by Lee's per- 
emptory order. It was a ghastly mockery to him when some hours later 
Lee, having seen the ground, ordered him to "advance and occupy the 
heights if practicable." At that time it was Impracticable. 

Finally our position was developed from that nucleus, and the line 
trailed away to the left, keeping the dominating ground, the Second Corps 
as it came up forming on the 'left of the First, the Third on the Second, 
the Fifth in reserve behind the Third, toward Round Top, and vv^ith the 
Twelfth Corps on Culp's Hill, our extreme right. Itself "a looming bas- 
tion" which the enemy was to find "fringed with fire." Altogether we 
occupied an extemporized Gibraltar, and the open field before our left 
front, giving a vast field of fire to all our batteries, was its crowning 
advantage. One historian has written to our disadvantage about the 
victory on the first day, but in a great battle there is only one victory. 
Many great battles appear to stretch over several days, but always the last 
of the several days is the real day of battle. All the others are only pre- 
liminary. Commanders manoeuvre and fight for position, to present their 
forces to the enemy with "the best foot foremost," to get a good field for 
all your fire, to hold ground with the flanks well covered, to hold the road 
by which the men behind may come up, and so on. To get all that is the 
concern of the earlier days, and that was wihat we were doing on the first 
day; and we gained a position the importance of which was equivalent to 
20,000 more men. To say that in doing that we were beaten on the first 
day is to ignore all the essential facts in the case. 



Lights Out. 

Orders in camp that night were "No fires and no lights," and they 
were not obeyed very strictly. All the open parts on the ridge south of 
the cemetery were traversed in various directions by stone walls, stone 
walls of the usual height and very solidly built. In the angles of these 
stone walls fellows made fires discreetly. That is, they chose angles in 
which the walls running either way were between the fires and the enemy, 
for the enemy's line of fire was over all that space from three directions— 
from the east, the north and the west — and they kept up a random firing 
all night. Perhaps they saw some tlickering of these fires. But the 
temptation to make fires was very great, for in a piece of fried 'bacon and 
a cup of coffee made at such a time there is such a comfort that no man 
w'ho dines at Delmonico's has imagination enough to understand. And. 
besides, everybody knew that the Provost Marshal was far away in the 
rear. Finally there was a feeling that we were pretty well tucked in, and 
nearly everybody went to sleep, for everybody was tired to death. 'But 
some fellows with a passion for making entrenchments were making 
them all night. But there were thousands of gallant fellows lying out on 
the open region for whom it was an awful night; splendid boys "looking 
proudly to heaven from the deathbed of fame." 

//. 

Lee's Plan for the Second Day. 

ON the morning of July 2 at daylight Gen. Lee and Gen. Ewell rode 
together around our extreme right and studied the ground there, 
and Gen. Lee's plan for the second day was probably gone over 
on that ride, for it contemplated as one part of it aiu attack by Ewell at 
that place. The other part was the battle intended on our left. These 
were two parts of one conception, for Lee saw that when Meade's left 
was assailed, as he intended to assail it, Meade would be com'pelled to 
reinforce it from the divisions on his right. Ewell was to have the advan- 
tage of the opportunity this would give him. If the attack on the left 
should be made before Meade had moved any part of his force from the 
right Ewell's attack would prevent his moving them, and this would help 
Longstreet. If when Ewell should make his attack Meade had already 
stripped his right to defend the left, then it would he easy for Ewell to 
capture and hold the strong positions on our right — Gulp's Hill and the 
eastern face of the Cemetery Ridge. 

It was a well imagined plan, 'but left out of consideration two im- 
portant factors. One was the impossibility of precise co-operation on the 



part of Lee's own army; the other was the resistance involved in the 
fighting quality of the Army of the Potomac. But for these two things 
it would have been a" beautiful scheme. Did Gen. Lee count these as parts 
of the game? Probably not; certainly not the second part, for all Lee's 
strategy and tactics together show that he regarded with contempt the 
army that was to beat him in the grandest game of his life. 

Gen. Lee never learned that in all his previous collisions with this 
army he had had the benefit of the incapacity with which the army was 
handled. He imagined that all his successes were the fruits of his own 
genius and the superior prowess of his army, and could not conceive that 
while he had whipped several unsatisfactory commanders he had never 
whipped the Army of the Potomac. He had smashed it always; what was 
easier than io smash it once more ? He was to see ! 

How Doth the little Busy Bee- 

From dayliglit until the middle of the afternoon it might have been 
thought by a farmer five miles away that we were all standing still, but 
this does not mean that any one was idle. Battles are not "continuous 
performances." On the contrary, they are fought in paroxysms. And all 
the time between the paroxysms is filled with the hard labor and strain 
of preparation. Our fellows had been working all night with axe and 
spade, and so now they worked all day. And the enemy gave us plenty 
of time. In these hours of golden opportunity were made miles of field 
works all aronnd our front — very significant parts of the case. They 
were not grand engineering fabrications, only some rails or trunks of trees 
stretched lengthwise along the line and covered to a height of two or three 
feet with eartlh. If the enemy's infantry ever reached these lines they 
could easily get over them, but the fellows behind the lines had a chance 
to operate on the visitor with rifle or bayonet. These works proved of 
great moment at Gulp's Hill. And in all these hours the enemy was 
occupied in the same latoor and also getting all things ready for the 
visits he intended to make us. And also all the day there were notable 
episodes and incidents in the operations of the sharpshooters, and the loss 
of Reynolds the day before showed the great possibilities of that part 
of the game. 

How a Sharpshooter Missed a Great Shot. 

In that forenoon one incident of that nature just missed becoming of 
historical importance, 

in the town of Gettysburg there was an old church with a tall 



10 

belfry, and as the enemy held that part of the town they had sharp- 
shooters up in that safe place. Perhaps, indeed, the very man w^o had 
killed Reynolds was there, with an eye to other generals— one of the 
fellows who always want 'big game. Cemetery Hill or Ridge was so high 
that the top of it was very nearly on a level with that belfry, and every- 
body going from one end of our line to the other came and went that 
way. It was the grand thoroughfare, and many men who happened to 
have no pressing duty lounged about there. To a man in that belfry 
everybody on Cemetery Ridge was in plain view. It was just as if you 
should look out of your window and see a man on the house top over 
yonder; and as to distance, it was only a fair rifle shot. 

Toward noon there met and conferred on the Ridge for several 
minutes two well mounted officers of the Union army, behind each of 
whom were several officers and orderlies. They were so placed that one 
had his right side toward the man in the belfry, the other his left side, and 
their faces were about three feet apart, and they talked in low tones. One 
of these was Gen. Meade, the commander of the army; the other Gen. 
John Newton, commander of the First Corps. And then between these 
two faces there passed the sharp "zip" of a rifle bullet. They heard it, 
but they thought it was a chance shot, and went on with their conference. 

But this scribe, about three yards away and in line with Newton, had 
seen the shot fired and saw the man who fired it, and the bullet zipped 
also not far from his face. He knew that the man in the belfry would 
fire again. Therefore he rode forward and told the generals how it was. 
and pointed out the man lin the belfry — and they continued their con- 
ference at another place. There was no place on that field where you 
could be sure you might not be hit, but it was not worth while to tak** 
foolish chances and perhaps change the command of the army once again. 

One of the good consequences of the enemy's dilatory tactics was 
that it helped our concentration, as it gave time for the coming up of one 
of our strongest corps — the Sixth — which arrived on this day. If there 
was in the Army of the Potomac any "old guard," that body was the 
Sixth Corps. And there was not a man in the army w'ho did not feel a 
sense of comfort in battle when he saw neai^by fellows with Greek crosses 
on their hats. 

Forces in Position. 

By the afternoon it became apparent that the marching and counter- 
marching of the enemy all day had ended in the concentration of a very 
heavy force on our left, a heavy force that was supposed to be hidden 



11 

from our sight, but a great part of which was in plain view from Little 
Round Top. What was not so well seen, and was indeed very little 
known,, was that behind Ewell's lines on our right anoither force of 8,000 
men were waiting for the word. Attention was the more fixed on the 
left because the position there was known to be tempting to the enemy. 

O'ur left on or near the famous Peach Orchard was held by the Third 
Corps, commanded by Gen. Sickles, and the right of that corps should 
have connected with the left of the Second Corps, the next in line; ^\^hile 
the left of the Third Corps should have reached as far as possible toward 
Round Top. But the line of the Third Corps, because of an untimely 
advance, was so placed that both its flanks were out in the air. 
As the enemy saw this case, one corps of our army was practically iso- 
lated, and that corps held a supremely important post. If it could be swept 
from its position Lee saw the easy possibility of doubling up our line on 
the left and fighting his way all along the slope from Round Top to the 
'Cemetery on the north end of the Ridge, and for this he planned the fight at 

The Peach Orchard. 

At 3 o'clock the Confederate artillery broke out on our left, every 
battery in that part of the field concentrating its fire on our line, and the 
greater part of it on the hill where the Peach Orchard was, and upon the 
line on either flank of that position. It was an effective fire, and the 
Peach Orchard was full of our infantry, and in and near it and beyond 
it toward the Wheat Field our batteries responded to the enemy's fire. 

At 5 o'clock Hood's division, the enemy's extreme right, advanced 
against the extreme left of the Third Corps line. His orders were to attack 
our line in his front — ^that is, a line that ran' nearly at a right angle with 
the Emmitsburg road from the Peach Orchard to the Wheat Field, and 
turn its left. As he went ahead he saw that our line was far stronger 
than it had been thought, and lie perceived that if he turned the position 
of the line at the Wtieat Held 'he would have on his rear whatever force we 
had on Round Top. He sent some scouts to take a look at our force 
there and found we had none ; that he could occupy Round Top save for 
his orders. He sent word to Longstreet to report this, and the answer 
was to act upon the original orders. 

At this time Hood was wounded and left the field and was succeeded 
by Gen. Laws, who then went ahead. But he changed his direction, 
either by intention or by the pressure of the fighting, and reached Round 
Top and went forward to Little Round Top. 'He now saw that his left 
was uncovered; that MacLaws with another division, who should have 
been there, was not in sight. He rode to find him, discovered that he had 



12 

nol moved ;iikl liaJ had no oideis lo move. MacLaws now received or- 
ders and went ahead. He was opposite llie Teach Orchard, and his ad- 
v;uice inunediatel}/ forced all that territic lif^'liting- tliat followed tor the 
Peach Orchard, the Wheat Field beliind it and all the ground up to the 
foot of Round Top. 

Here began Longs Ireet's part of the battle— for Hill's and ^liv/ell"s 
men had done all that preceded this. Longstreet was not happy that day. 
He was a great fighter, but he was a long-headed man also, and he saw 
that his men were fought at' a disadvantage, and that the awful cost of 
assailing men in strong positions— men as good as his own in every 
possible aspect — threatened to put in peril the success of this enormous 
operation of invading the INorfli. But he did the utmost that man could 
do. He was a giant — and so were Hood and MacLaws and the rest of them 
— but 'there were other giants in tliose days and on that spot, 'ilie 
Third was a splendid corps, and every cannon- and every rifle in it was 
fought for all it was worth despite the early loss of the connnander. 
'Lhere v^as gieat fighting face to face and every foot of ground was 
fought over to and fro for more than three liours. But the fhird Corps 
,did not have to do it all alone. Meade had provided timely reinforce- 
meirts, and the force on the right— the Second Corps— and the force in 
leserve behind and the force from the extreme right all came in. On 
the extreme right of Longstreet's line there was a critical hour near 
Round Top. 

Geu. Warren Saves Round Top. 

Gen. Warren at the signal station on Little Round Top had seen 
the operation of the right of the Hood division; iiad seen that it could 
occupy Round Top, and perceiving how disastrous that would be for us 
had acted promptly to prevent it. Help was near, for there was in that 
inmiediate region all the Lifth Corps, all the Sixth Corps, a part of the 
Second Corps and all the Twelfth Corps save one division. W-arren bor- 
rowed two brigades of the Tifth Corps — Vincent's and Weed's-^and put 
them in on the flank of 'Hood's division, which was doubled up and 
driven down the hill. But for over an hour more the fighting was fierce 
all along from the foot of Little Round Top to the Emmitsburg road, 
and all the force Meade had sent forward was in it, and the Third Corps 
of course, for Anderson's division of Hill's corps going in on the left of 
MacLaws extended the attack beyond the right of the Third Corps to the 
line of the Second. On all that front there was a titanic battle for three 
hours. 

As night came on the enemy fell back, but did not retire. He had 



13 

conquered the position ;it the Peach Orcliard and counted that as a vic- 
tory. In fact his conquering tliat position corrected our line — made it 
just as it would have 'been if Meade's orders had been carried out — lor 
the orders intended that that should be outside of our line. Our losses 
were very heavy; those of the enemy apparently far greater. Hood's divi- 
sion lost there 2,000 men. Small incidents will sometimes give a meas- 
ure of losses. Kershaw reports that one company of the Second South 
Carolina went into the battle with forty men and at night only four were 
left to 'bury the others. 

The Struggle On Our Right. 

Finally as everything was over on our left in came Ewell's men on 
the right— the other part of the plan. This was about 8 o'clock. Was this 
a want of co-operation on the part of Lee's army? In part, perhaps, it 
was. But there was another reason for this delay, b'well's men, keeping a 
sharp lookout, had seen how one command after another had been sent 
away from our right to reinforce our left. They had seen the division 
of Alpheus Williams 'marched away, then 'Ruger's division and all of 
Geary's that was there; all from Gulp's Hill; and had seen other com- 
mands marched away from Cemetery Ridge. They played to let that 
go on, and may have thought that at last they could march in and oc- 
cupy undefended ground. And it nearly came to that. 

At 8 o'clock they came in force. Against Cemetery Ridge were sent 
the five Louisiana regiments of Hayes's brigade and four North Carolina 
regiments of Hoke's brigade. They rushed the thin line in front, but 
were much torn up by the fire of the Fifth Maine Battery at the head 
of the gulch between the hills. It enfiladed their line. They reached 
the (batteries behind our line, Stevens's, Wiedrick's and Rickett's. They 
were well riddled before they reached the batteries, and at the batteries 
there was a savage hand-to-hand fight. Help was near. From Han- 
cock's corps came Carroll's brigade, which went into the melee with the 
bayonet, and the enemy was driven out, leaving on the field a'bout two- 
thirds of 'his men. 

On Gulp's 'Hill things were worse. It was charged by three brigades 
of Johnson's division — Jones, Williams and Stewart — fourteen regiments. 
And how was it defended? By one small brigade — six New York regi- 
ments that had been killed down in many battles till they were mere 
skeletons of regiments — the Sixtieth, Seventy-sixth, Ninety-fifth, One 
Hundred and Second, One Hundred and Forty-ninth and One Hundred 
and Seventy-eighth. But the man in command was a hero. This was 
Gen. George S. Greene, a modest, capable, ever ready soldier, a hard 



14 

fighter, the best type you coiild tind of the men whose heads and hearts 
had made the Army of the Potomac. 

The Bnemy Captures and Holds All JSight a l^ari oi 
Our Lines* 

Gulp's Hill was a strong position, but sixteen of the regiments posted 
for its defense had been sent over to the left, and only Greene was there, 
and the enemy came at him hammer and tongs, and it looked for a mo- 
ment as if this part of Lee's plan was to be an amazing success. But 
Greene held his lines and kept the enemy off for two hours. Finally 
some of the enemy, creeping around to the extreme right of our line, dis- 
covered that part of our works there were unoccupied. That was the 
part of the line that had been held by the troops sent away. When they 
went Greene had had traverses made at the end of his line. As soon as 
the enemy got his men into the unoccupied line they made a rush for 
Greene's line, but the fire of Greene's men from behind the traverses 
cooled their ardor and they sat down to wait for reinforcements. 

Greene also had sent for reinforcements, but they did not come ; and 
it was a time when every moment was fraught with imminent peril for 
our position. If sufficiently reinforced the enemy already lodged within 
our lines would certainly endeavor to rush our feebly held defenses, and 
might carry them, and he would then have an open way to turn our 
whole line. Reinforcements had been sent to Greene, but they did not 
reach him. Riding myself to join him, 1 happened to learn why and to 
help unravel one of the complications that may always arise in a night 
battle. Col. Kane with a Pennsylvania regiment and some other force 
marching to join Gen. Greene had suddenly found himself under fire 
from the front, and the fire had come, as he thought, from Greene's men, 
for he did not know that the enemy held part of that line, and he be- 
lieved Greene's men fired upon him supposing him the enemy. If he 
returned the fire he would, as he thought, be firing upon our men. If 
he did not go ahead he could not perform his duty. If he went ahead 
how many men would he lose? In that state of mind I found him, and 
as I knew the way in, I agreed to go ahead and tell our fellows who he 
was, supposing always, as he did, that the firing was from our line. I 
easily found Gen. Greene, told him the story, and he sent an officer to 
guide in Col. Kane's force. So the old General had a good reinforce- 
ment and they held the lines that nig'ht, for the enemy knew that sup- 
ports had come in and they became wary. 

During the night the enemy's men holding that part of our line were 
heavily reinforced. There came to them Walker's brigade from John- 



15 

son's division (iiie old Stonewall Brigade) and Daniel's and O'Neal's bri- 
gades from Rode's division. 

So there were seven strong brigades of the enemy on that hill. 
Across a level region in front of them half a mile away was the Baltimore 
turnpike. On that turnpike they would be in rear of all our forces 
formed with the front the other way and could take the end of Cemetery 
Ridge in reverse, and if they had known it they could have brought 20,000 
in the way they came that night. When our regiments, returning from 
the other side, found their .position in the hands of the enemy they 
formed a line there and slept on their arms waiting for daylight. 

These were all the absent divisions of the Twelfth Corps. There 
came also Shaler's brigade of the Sixth Corps. 

That night the report from the different corps made our effective 
force 58,000. If we had 80,000 in the beginning, as some histories make 
it, these two days had cost us 22,000 men. But we never had so many 
as 80,000. 

III. 

Lee's Opportunity. 

ON the third day we had this bad case to begin with : Seven brigades 
of the Confederate army — that is to say, all the division of 
Edward Johnson, one brigade from Early's division and two 
from Rode's were in possession of part of our lines on Culp's Hill, the 
part they had captured the night before. This force was equal in num- 
bers and in every respect to the Confederate force that had done all the 
fighting on our left the day before. There were twenty-six regiments of 
veteran infantry. This was more than half of what was left of E well's 
corps, and his five other brigades were near to reinforce those on the hill. 
Our line was not safe for one minute till they should be driven out. This 
was Slocum's battle. 

At daylight that force of the enemy was in line to advance and oc- 
cupy the Baltimore road only a little ways in front of them. And there 
were no entrenchments here — no obstacle 'but the line of boys in blue. 
If they reached the Baltimore road they would he in the rear of all our 
force on the main front, from Cemetery Ridge to Round Top, and it 
does not nee^nuch imagination' to see how enormously this would favor 
the other operations that Lee intended against that front. Lee had in the 
night changed his plan for the day, obviously with regard to this possi- 
bility. iHis first plan had been to push and fully develop the oblique at- 
tack on our left, co-operating with Ewell on the right. But when in the 
night he learned how great his losses had been on our left and that he 



16 

had really gained nothing, and saw the immense possibility of ^Ewell's 
advance, he gave up the first plan and determined upon the grand attack 
on our main front. 

With our army in safe possession of all the ground it had held, an 
attack on its main front would be a vain waste of force, but with Ewell 
and all his corps on the Baltimore road much of our army would be 
compelled to change front and face him, and in that critical time an at- 
tack in great force on our front would be a master stroke. It was in the 
spirit of that purpose that be said to somebody he "was going to send 
every man he had upon that hill." Suppose he should do that while 
these men .of Ewell's corps had already a lodgment within our lines! 

Before we reject what Gordon said and others have said since about 
Lee's intention that Longstreet's grand operation should be done earlier 
in the day it is well to consider this possible relation of the two parts of 
that day's work. 

The Opportunity Passes* 

But the parts of our army that had been sent from Gulp's Hill the 
day 'before were now all in- line between Ewell and the Baltimore road, and 
before Ewell's men were ready to advance all the artillery of Williams's 
division of the Twelfth Gorps opened on them and punished them tre- 
mendously, though they had some cover by getting on the other side of 
our works out there. As soon as the fire ceased our fellows went -ahead — 
Williams's men, Ruger's and Geary's — and Ewell's men advanced to meet 
them. Ewell's men were driven, but they rallied and came again. There 
were savage hand-to-hand conflicts. 

All our men in that part of the field were in this fierce, critical, 
desperate fight — Cjreene's men, Gandy's, Colgrove's, Kane's, Shaler's 
brig-ade of the Sixth Corps and Meredith's famous "Iron Brigade" of the 
First Gorps, which had killed or captured more than all its own numbers 
in the first day's fight. New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Massa- 
chusetts, Wisconsin, Indiana, Michigan and Gonnecticut were all in that 
awful little battle, and by 1 1 o'clock, or about that time, every man of 
Ewell's corps was driven out of the position, and in such a state that they 
were not likely to come again. No fi^^hting on all that field was of 
greater moment than this. 'But up to this time there wa^o sign of the 
grand attack on our front, which was comprehensible tmicallv only if 
intended as coincident with this fight. The spectacular event was to come, 
but the battle was won on Gulp's Hill. Beautiful fig'hting which, like 
some other notable bits of history, seems to have slipped between the 
fingers of the fellows who work the hurrah machines ! 



17 

Preparing for Great Things in Front. 

At the council of war on the nigtt of the 2d it had been agreed that 
some corrections should be made in our line; and a very important one 
of these was made on our left front, Jby which all that part of the line 
that had been on the Emmitsburg road was withdrawn from that road 
and formed on a line about half way between it and the Taneytown 
road. This closed up the gap 'between the left of our line and Little 
Round Top, and considerably enlarged our field of fire on the open 
region toward the enemy, which proved of great importance. 

'For two or three hours now there was a quiet like that of Sunday; 
and there was within our lines the common wonder, "What next?" Gen. 
Meade was at least one man who knew exactly what was to come, for he 
had shown that singular quality of superior generalship — the capacity to 
understand his opponent, to read the mind he had to deal with. At the 
council of war, at night on the 2d, he said to Gibbon: "Lee has attacked 
and failed on both our flanks. If he attacks to-morit)w it will be on our 
centre; on your front." Gibbon said: "If he comes we will take care of 
him." 

And he was coming! 

Getting Ready* 

For the grand attack intended Gen. lee was now getting his men 
in position. All this went on very slowly, fortunately for us. The forces 
assigned for making this grand stroke were Pickett's division of Long- 
street's corps, that only came up that morning, and Heth's and Pender's, 
of Hill's corps, which had done a great part of the hard fighting of the 
first day. It was not an overwhelming force. Only one division was 
fresh. Longstreet said: "The three divisions will give me 15,000 men. 
But there never was a body of 15,000 men that could make that charge 
successfully." 

For this small piece of common sense he was held to be disloyal to 
Lee. But such as they were, the three divisions were drawn up and held 
ready in the woods out on Seminary Ridge, well out of sight. 

Two Hundred and Fifty Cannon Firing for an Hour. 

At 1 o'clock 138 pieces of Confederate artillery, posted all along the 
line of Seminary Ridge, opened fire on our front. All that fire v/as tre- 
mendous for noise and very destructive for effect. But everybody was 
used to such things. That fire had particular purposes. It might cripple 
many of our batteries that commanded the open ground in front, and it 
did cripple a number; and as it would certainly draw our fire, and our 



18 

amimunition migtit be running' low, it mig'ht exhaust what we had, and 
thus make things easier for the fellows that were to come across that 
open ground. Our fellows, however, had cut their eye teeth as to am- 
munition. 

Our batteries responded with not less vigor, and we had better bat- 
teries and better ammunition; and all the way from Cemetery Ridge to 
Round Top, and from the crest of the hill behind, sloping down to the 
road in front, the mountainside was like a volcano — ^a volcano with 
twenty craters. People only record their impressions when they say 
that such a cannonade makes the earth tremble; for the effect upon the 
atmosphere of this noise, this constantly recurring yet practically con- 
tinuous concussion, touches one's perceptions as if the earth were reeling. 

There was more than an hour of that; and then, while the enemy 
was still firing with all his force, the order was given on our side to 
"cease firing." This was to save our ammunition, tout it was to the 
enemy the sign they had looked for as an evidence that our ammunition 
was used up. They rejoiced over it. 

Who Will J^aunch This Bolt of Battle? 

So the moment seemed to have come. There had'ibeen some hesita- 
tion about giving the final order for the Confederate charge. Longstreet, 
in the words reported above, had protested against it. Lee did not repeat 
the order. He merely did not withdraw it ; so it stood upon bis silence. 
Longstreet repeated it to Pickett, but told him not to move yet, tout wait 
till Alexander, the chief of artillery, should give the word after the can- 
nonading. Alexander was instructed to open with all his guns and give 
the word to Pickett when our batteries should be silenced. Longstreet 
further qualified this, and said: "If it is not pretty certain that your fire 
demoralizes the enemy I should prefer that you would not advise Gen: 
Pickett to make the charge." 

So it was up to Alexander. He was to advise or not advise the 
making of the charge, and to overrule or confirm Gen. Lee. Thus, the 
order when it did reach Pickett came in a roundabout way, and was the 
result of an erroneous opinion that our batteries were silenced and our 
army demoralized. iBut when Alexander had reached that opinion he 
gave the order, and the infantry swept forward down the ridge and into 
the field of fire of all our guns. 

Who the Fellows Were* 

These were the regiments that were to strike the last tolow of the 
Confederacy in Pennsylvania: 



19 

Pickett's Division, three brigades — Garnett's Virginia Eightli, Eigh- 
teenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-eightli, Fifly-sixth; Armistead's Virginia Four- 
teenth, Thirty-eighth, .Fiifty-seventh, Fifty-eighth; Kemper's Virginia First, 
Third, Seventh, Eleventh, Twenty-fourth. 

Heth's, commanded by Pettigrew, four brigades — ^Pettigrew's North 
Carolina Eleventh, Twenty-sixth, Forty-seventh, Fifty-second; Brocken- 
boug'h's Virginia Fortieth, Forty-seventh, Fifty-fifth ; Archer's, command- 
ed by Fry, Alabama Fifth, Thirteenth, Tennessee First, Seventh, Four- 
teenth ; Davis's Mississippi Second, Eleventh, Eorty-second, North Caro- 
lina Fifty-fifth. 

Pender's, commanded by Trimble, four brigades — ^Perrin's South 
Carolina First, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth; Lane's North Carolina 
Seventh, Eighteenth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-third, Thirty-seventh; Scale's 
North Carolina Sixteenth, Twenty-second, Thirty-fourth, Thirty-eighth; 
Thomas's Georgia Fourteenth, Thirty-fifth, Forty-fifth, Forty-ninth. 

For Gen. Lee this was the charge of "Pickett's Virginia regiments." 
There were forty-eight regimients, and eighteen of these were Virginia 
regiments. 

Marching Into Immortality. 

And all these fine fellows stepped forward into immortality as if 
each one felt all the glory of the occasion. Every battery on our side 
opened again, and the Confederate batteries, beyond Pickett, firing over 
his head, did what they might to cripple our batteries and drive our men 
to cover; and the thunder and roar and hum and murmur and swing of 
the air came again, and with it a sound like the thin, far-away ghost of 
the rebel yell. 

As this force, indulging a little in that vague vocal satisfaction, came 
under the fire of our guns its formation suggested that it might have 
been planned for the advantage of our artillery. On the left it was in 
three lines, say six files deep. Behind Pettigrew came Garnett and Frye, 
and behind them Brockentoo^g'h. On the right it was in six lines. No 
gun could fail to hit one or the other, and if a shell went over one line 
it exploded in the next. 

And the air over them was full of the queer little pictures made by 
the exploding shells. For a shell as it expodes up there looks as if it 
bursts into bloom. You see, as if coming from nowhere, ibut originating 
there, a sudden, small mass of dense white vapor, like a buntfh of cotton, un- 
folding itself in circular volumes that grow larger and larger, as if a 
flower expanded its parts and gave place to the others; and over a hun- 
dred guns firing five times a minute were supplying those blooms — 



20 

grand blooms in the air, with deadly consequences down below — for it 
rained scrap iron on the heads of those heroic fellows. And there were 
nearly twenty minutes of that before them; and in the noise of our guns 
and of their guns and the exploding of the shells the rebel yell dwindled 
to a poor little plaintive sound — rather like an appeal than a defiance. 

The Awful Roar and the Iron Rain. 

On the enemy's .front was a line of skirmishers, and as these fel- 
lows fired at our skirmishers out on the field the little jet of vapor from 
the muzzles of the pieces was a quaint, small detail of the picture, and 
gave it military formality. And all came on with a splendid swing, 
marching grandly, freely, nonchalantly, as if there was no such thing as 
artillery in the world and as if the notion of twenty batteries, each gun 
firing five times a minute, was a vague fancy of the philosophers with 
which they had no concern. And the grand roar went on — ^the great 
thunder of the guos themselves, the fearful shriek-scream whizz or whirr 
of the shells as they tore through the air — ^the smaller detonation of ex- 
ploding shells as each one at the end of its trajectory scattered its scraps 
of "iron indignation" on the heads below. And who could hear what man 
might have to say? 

And all that was not merely noise. It was a very destructive fire; 
for as our fellows held the side of the long slope — say a mile and a half 
long by three or four hundred yards wide — there was not a spot on which 
the deadly missiles did not fall. Fortunately, the enemy appeared to 
make one blunder. They did not concentrate their fire on the point wnere 
the attackin'g column would strike, but fired a great deal over us and 
over the ridge, many shells exploding in our rear. Perhaps they thought 
our fellows were massed over there. 

Alexander, of the Confederate artillery, with eighteen guns, came on in 
the rear of Pickett's right to support him against any advance on our part 
if he should suddenly fail to go ahead. 

Our fire was wonderfully effective, and no such body in any battle 
in the world had ever made such an advance against so many batteries of 
such artillery. Longstreet, who looked on, saw the gaps in the lines 
made by our fire, and saw that one of our batteries on- Round Top (Rit- 
tenhouse's), enfiladed the lines, and that one shell would sometimes knock 
down five or six men. 

How They Looked. 

But they came on — down the little slope of Seminary Ridge toward 
the Emmitslburg road. As that line was in its glory it made a picture that 



appealed to the ipride of every one that saw them, but apparently not to 
any sense of pity. That was a thought not in the case. They had a 
front of about 500 yards, and fhey had no advantage from those things 
that sometimes make "the pride, pomp and circumstance of glorious war." 
There was no color, no gold lace, no plumes; but only their not par- 
ticularly fine battle flags; and there was a dignity be3^ond imagination 
in the simplicity of it all. In that gray line — so called, but not even a 
real gray, rather a dingy something between real gray and dirty white — 
it seemed as if everything had been excluded that might distract thought 
for a minute from the men themselves; from the grim splendor of line 
upon line of magnificent manhood, marching defiantly, proudly, glori- 
ously to certain death, without even the chance that what they were doing 
could add an ounce to the scale of victory for their army. For the scheme 
was that the main column was to seize and pierce our line, and the sup- 
ports were to come in and do the rest; yet supports and all were all un- 
der the same fire, and all going down together, so that the theory was a 
"barren ideality." 

The Canopy and Haze of Glory. 

Perhaps they showed more grandly now for the fact that as they 
came out of the depression they were partly in a haze, for the smoke of 
all the guns and the vapor of the thousands of shells that exploded over 
their heads and within their lines and the volunie of dust that the feet 
of such a column always raises made a canopy over them and an uncer- 
tain screen about them. So they came on, and reached near the E'mmits- 
burg road the lowest part of the depression between the two ridges, a 
point partly protected from our fire by the inequalities of the ground be- 
tween. At this point they halted a little, not so much to breathe, per- 
haps, as to close up their lines. By this time their skirmishers were lost 
in the line. Codori's house broke their front as they reached it, and that 
was another element of disorder. 

They Are Half Way. 

At this point they had made more than half their distance. They were 
about 500 yards away and near to the bottom of the sudden slope at the 
top of which was the line of the Second Corps. All our batteries that 
confronted them save those in the Second Corps now fired shrapnel and 
case, and this tore frightful gaps into what was no longer a line. But 
the mass came on, and in the twinkling of an eye the rifles opened — 
some at 200 yards, others at 100 — and the force wilted and failed and 



22 

melted away. Others behind them took their places and were skiughiered 
in their turn, and yet the amazing fellows came on. 

Some Are Still Alive at Cur Line. 

In spite of all the firing a body of the enemy's men did reach our 
line. But this was due to a fault on our side. At the time when the or- 
der to cease firing had been given to save our ammunition that order had 
not been obeyed by the batteries of the Second Corps. They had con- 
tinued to fire, and had, in fact, used up their ammunrtion; so that when 
the enemy were within 400 yards and all the other batteries were tearing 
the line with case shot the batteries of that command were silent, and 
the enemy escaped a fire that must have destroyed them entirely. 

These fellows having reached our line alive, almost by a miracle, 
behaved as if the position were theirs 'by some sort of divine right, and 
they had only to take possession; and a hundred came over the stone 
fence in front firing in the faces of our fellows. They were two or three 
thousand to a whole corps, with two other corps behind it. This was a 
fight of a few minutes hand to hand with our fellows, the enemy at last 
fighting only to get away. One brigade of ours — Webb's — captured a 
thousand men in this little melee. But how different it would all have 
been if Ewell had then had his corps on the Baltimore road ! 

So Dies a Wave Along the Shore. 

There was no more in front that day. But in rear of our right there 
was a tough cavalry fight with Jeb Stuart. He had been put there by 
iLee in order to harass our retreat when the grand operation in front 
should drive us from our position. Fate will always have its little irony. 

And so the fierce fighting of three days ended in a towering, over- 
whelming debauchery of battle ; a grand paroxysm of insane tactics which, 
like an operation of the same character on a smaller scale in the Crimean 
war, was, if you like, magnificent, 'but was not war. For this was a charge 
that could not affect the issue. It could not retrieve the defeat of Long- 
street on our left the day before nor Ewell on our right this day. It could 
only determine against Lee the result of those fights. It was simply an 
amazing military pageant — a grand human sacrifice on the altar of the 
gods of glory. It was the most wasteful thing ever done on a field of 
battle — a waste not merely of human life, but of 10,000 trained, tried 
veteran soldiers — fellows that can be counted upon in the stress of battle. 

As some Confederate officers had talked about that march to our 
lines, the Confederate General Wright had said: "It is not so hard to go 
there as it looks. The trouble is to stay there. The whole Yankee army 



23 

is there in a buncii." There was the practical point. If when that column 
had gone through all the firing it should reach our lines with four or five 
thousand men still on foot, what then ? Why, that four or five thousand 
would be face to face with all the Second Corps, supported on the right 
by the First Corps, on the left by the Third, with the Fifth and Sixth 
Corps behind these. 

What Might Have Been— 'If." 

Much has been said with an "if" about what might have been done ; 
and with a sufficient number of "ifs" you could change the result of 
every battle that ever was fought in all the ages. Gen. Lee apparently 
did say, long after: "If I had had Stonewall Jackson at Gettysburg 1 
would have won that fight." Gen. Lee was never a "spendthrift with his 
tongue;" yet even reticent men may be tempted into making phrases by 
an adequate pressure of fool friends, and a phrase in glorification of Jack- 
son was apt enough upon the lips of the man who had so much reason 
to admire him. Certainly between Jackson and Pickett there was a 
notable difference. Yet why reproach Pickett because he was not Jack- 
son? He was a very gallant soldier. But in playing a speculative game 
with "ifs" it may fairly be said that if Lee had won at Gettysburg he 
would not have won by that charge, for Jackson would probably not 
have made it. Yet if he had made it, it would have been all the same. 

Lee had put 15,000 men as a target in front of our army on open 
ground exposed to the fire of twenty batteries of good artillery for 
twenty minutes and to the fire of 20,000 rifles for ten minutes. Every 
battery and every -ifle was "good for" a given number of men every 
minute. And this simple operation of the mechanism of battle destroyed 
that column, and would have destroyed it though there had been in it 
every dashing soldier known to military history from Julius Caesar to 
Phil Sheridan. 

Gen. Lee as He Looked That Day and Felt That Night. 

Gen. Alexander, of Confederate artillery, saw Gen. Lee out in the 
field on the ground the charge had gone over immediately after the re- 
pulse, and he said : "It was a momentous thing to him to see that bloody 
repulse, but whatever his emotions there was no trace of them in his 
calm and self-possessed bearing." Several have borne witness to the 
moral grandeur with which Lee assumed all the responsibilit}- and to the 
intellectual stamina with which he faced it. 

■ But night came, and it was different. Gen. Imboden saw him after 
midnight, and has described in a few words his awful depression. Imboden 



24 

had been instructed to come for orders ,and when he was m Lee's pres- 
ence it was several minutes before the General spoke; and Imboden, per- 
ceiving: his state, "was unwilling to intrude upon his reflections" and 
waited in silence. When Lee spoke he said "in a voice tremulous with 
emotion:" '•] never saw troops behave more magnificently than Pickett's 
division of Virginians did to-day in that grand charge upon the enemy. 
And if they had been supported — as they were to have been, but for 
some reason not yet fully explained to me were not — we would have 
held the position and the day would have been ours." And he added, in 
a tone almost of agony: "Too bad! Too bad! Oh, too bad!" And Im- 
boden adds: "I shall never forget his language, his manner and his ap- 
pearance of mental suffering." 

Imboden was at that conference instructed by Lee in certain duties 
relating to the retreat, which began that night. 

Pate Sometimes Takes a Man at Bis Word. 

'But the end of this battle was finally in full accordance with Lee's 
own proposition. At Seminary Ridge, on July 1, he had talked with 
Longstreet, and Longstreet had argued against attacking our lines; had 
urged operations of manoeuvre that might change the parts and make 
ours the assailing force. Lee had answered: "No. The enemy is there 
and 1 am going to attack them. They are there in position, and 1 am 
going to whip them or they are going to whip me." 

That was the bold and resolute declaration of a great soldier, and 
things came out that way. Only the alternative had taken the place of 
the main proposition — "they" had whipped him. 

He had contemplated a possibility that the steady courage and de- 
termined spirit of our well commanded army had made a reality, and 
the Army of the Potomac, while not vainglorious about it, did feel all 
the grandeur of the result, and felt that it had conquered a foe worthy 
of its valor and had saved the Union. It was satisfied to feel this, and 
never bragged about it. 



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